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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(4), and Utah R. App. P. 42.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

As a matter of law and based upon undisputed material

facts, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and thus correctly
awarded defendants summary judgment.
Although in reviewing summary judgment awards this Court
must ordinarily consider the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom

in the light most favorable to the appellant, Culp

Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990), when
summary

judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Court of

Appeals reviews for correctness the legal conclusion of the trial
court.

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992); see

also Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah
1979) (court evaluates whether moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law where there is no genuine dispute as to material
issues of fact or where court assumes facts as contended by losing
party).
2.

This Court should alternatively affirm summary judgment

based upon undisputed facts and binding case law presented to the
trial court below, although not forming a basis for the trial
court's granting of summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds.
This Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied
on below."

Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993)

(citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah
1992) ) .
3.

The trial court did not err in requiring plaintiff to pay

for the costs of a transcript for this Court's review on appeal.
Although no precedential case appears directly on point,
the decision to award expenses or costs rests within the discretion
of the trial court and should not be overturned absent a showing of
a clear abuse of that discretion.
877 P.2d

156

Cf. T.S. Partnership v. Allred,

(Utah App. 1994) (determination of attorney fees

within sound discretion of trial court and not overturned absent
showing of clear abuse of discretion).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 provides in part:
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be initiated unless and
until the plaintiff gives the prospective
defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action.
Other provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
including Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) require the party initiating
a medical malpractice action to file a request for prelitigation
panel review with the Department of Commerce within 60 days after
the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under
Section 78-14-8; and Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 1994) provides
in part:
(10)
"Health care" means any act or
treatment performed or furnished, or which
should have been performed or furnished, by
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf
of a patient during the patient's medical
care, treatment, or confinement.
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(11) "Health care provider" includes any
person, partnership, association, corporation,
or other facility or institution who causes to
be rendered or who renders health care or
professional
services
as
a
hospital,
physician,
registered
nurse,
licensed
practical
nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist,
dental
hygienist,
optometrist,
clinical
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical
therapist,
podiatrist,
psychologist,
chiropractic
physician,
naturopathic
physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic
physician and surgeon, audiologist, speechlanguage pathologist, clinical social worker,
certified
social worker, social
service
worker,
marriage
and
family
counselor,
practitioner
of
obstetrics,
or
others
rendering similar care and services relating
to or arising out of the health needs of
persons or groups of persons and officers,
employees, or agents of any of the above
acting in the course and scope of their
employment.

(14)
"Malpractice action against a
health care provider" means any action against
a health care provider, whether in contract,
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or
otherwise,
based
upon
alleged
personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health
care rendered or which should have been
rendered by the health care provider.

(31)
"Tort" means any legal wrong,
breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act
or omission proximately causing injury or
damage to another.
(Emphasis added.) 1

x

The definitional section of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act has been amended approximately five times since
1976. The current version is quoted, and contrary to any
implication raised by plaintiff, all versions support the trial
court's decision below.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,
This is an appeal from the trial court's awarding of summary

judgment to defendants essentially on the grounds that as a matter
of law and based upon the undisputed material facts defendants were
health care providers under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3, plaintiff's
action constituted a malpractice action governed by the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act and the Court was thus without jurisdiction
since plaintiff had failed to comply with statutory prerequisites
to suit.
B.

(R. at 1557-58, 1568-69.)

Course and Disposition of Proceedings Below.
On April 5, 1991, plaintiff initiated his complaint in this

matter

against defendants.

(See R.

2-21.)

In their

answer

defendants admitted that Turnabout was licensed by the State of
Utah as a day treatment program.
After

(R. 24 at H 3.)

significant discovery had been completed relative to

the legal issue raised, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment on April 14, 1993, claiming in part that the trial court
lacked

jurisdiction since plaintiff had failed to comply with

provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

(R. 871-72

(motion) and R. 643-834 (memorandum with supporting exhibits).)
The court granted defendants' motion for summary

judgment

essentially determining that defendants are health care providers
as defined under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, plaintiff's
action was one for medical malpractice and plaintiff had failed to
comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
(R. at 1557-58, 1569.)
4

After

plaintiff

initiated

this

appeal, defendants cross-

designated the transcript of the trial court's August 23, 1993
hearing and the trial court granted defendants' motion to require
appellant to request the transcript and to pay for the same.
(R. 1587-93.)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Introductory Note
Since counsel for defendants on appeal is the same counsel
that prepared and submitted argument for defendants below and
inasmuch as defendants view the arguments and factual analysis
presented below as supportive of this Court's affirmance of summary
judgment, defendants substantially rely upon the same and for ease
in this Court's review may quote extensively from those facts and
arguments without reflecting quote marks or indented paragraphs.
1.

On April 5, 1991, plaintiff filed his action against

defendants in this case.

(R. 2-21.)

As part of that complaint

plaintiff essentially admitted and alleged:
[a.] . . . Turnabout is organized to
serve the public as a support and self help
entity for families and to serve the public as
a crisis intervention program. Turnabout is
licensed by the State of Utah as a day
treatment program. [R. at 3 U 3.]

[b.]
On or about June 21, 1989,
Plaintiff signed a contract with Turnabout for
the treatment of Gary Platts. [R. at 5 H 18.]

[c]
. . . Turnabout failed to provide
the treatment called for by the contract thus
materially
breaching
its
contract
with
Plaintiff. [R. at 8 H 44.]
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[d.] Turnabout, Comins Defendants John
Does . . . owed a duty of care to Plaintiff
and Gary Platts in the care and treatment of
Gary* [R. at 8 H 47.]
[e.] Gary Platts was receiving care and
treatment from Turnabout for behavior problems
that
included
running
away,
truancy.
depression, substance use and feelings of
inadequacy. [R. at 8-9, H 48.]

[f] Without consulting plaintiff and in
violation of Turnabout policies defendants
. . . released Gary to go to school . . .
[after which he ran and committed suicide]
knowing of his depression, feelings of
inadequacy, marijuana use and tendencies to
run away. [R. at 9 1f 52.]

[g]
By releasing Gary Platts
Turnabout failed to provide the treatment
called for by the contract. [R. at 8 U 44.]
(Emphasis added.)
2.

Two years after plaintiff filed this lawsuit in this

matter and after lengthy and detailed discovery, defendants filed
their motion for summary judgment with supporting memorandum and
exhibits.

(R. 871-72 (motion) and R. 643-834 (memorandum with

supporting exhibits).)
3.

In that memorandum, defendants set forth 35 pages of

undisputed facts supportive of the claims that:

(1) defendants

were entitled to summary judgment since plaintiff had failed to
comply with the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
as

prerequisites

to

suit

and

the

trial

jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's case; and

court

thus

lacked

(2) defendants were

entitled to summary judgment since plaintiff could not prove his
theories of recovery given the undisputed material facts when
6

considered with the applicable rule of law.

(See R. 643-98 (and

exhibits attached thereto).)
4.

As to defendants' jurisdictional argument, the court was

provided undisputed facts of record demonstrating in part:
[a.]
The purpose of Parents Helping
Parents [dba Turnabout] was to benefit the
mental health of the community.

[b.]
. . . Turnabout is a community
based health treatment program for youth
exhibiting out of control behaviors. [R. at
670.]

[c.
Turnabout dealt in this case with
issues involving] using illegal substances or
alcohol. [R. 671.]
(R. at 669-71 and cited exhibits thereto (emphasis added).)
5.

In defendants' reply memorandum to plaintiff's objection

to summary judgment, the court was provided additional undisputed
record facts and evidence dispositive of defendants' jurisdictional
claim:2
(a)

[Turnabout's director Jack Wiseman] had
certification
through
the
Utah
Association
of Alcoholism
and
Drug
Addiction Counselors.
(See Wiseman
Deposition attached hereto as Exhibit 2,
at
p.
5
(hereinafter
"Wiseman
Deposition").)

(b)

[Defendant Alan Comins] is a Certified
Addictions
Counselor with
the Utah
Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Counselors and a National Certification
Addictions Counselor through the National
Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse

2

A11 parenthetical citations in this extended and indented
quote (pp, 7-14, infra) are to exhibits attached to defendants'
reply memorandum at R. 1170-1226 and were presented to the trial
court as part of defendants' motion. For clarity and brevity,
certain paragraphs have been renumbered and combined.
7

Counselors.
(See Comins Deposition,
attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at pp. 8
and 9 (hereinafter "Comins Deposition").)
(c)

Mr. Comins views himself as a mental
health care professional and defendants
fall under the Division of Social
Services licensing and under the Mental
Health and Drug and Alcohol aspect
thereof.
(See Comins Deposition at p.
10.)

(d)

The requirements for being employed at
Turnabout during 1989 and 1990 in part
generally required individuals [to have a
bachelors
degree
in
sociology
or
psychology]
to
have
professional
knowledge in four or five selected areas,
including behavior management, social
work and psychology, or to have had a
background in working in and around
youths having problems and individuals
with personal recovery history.
(See
Wiseman deposition at p. 20; Comins
Deposition at pp. 70-71.)

(e)

At the time of the incidents in question,
Mary McGee was a Licensed Clinical Social
Worker
and
Clinical
Director
of
Turnabout. (See Comins Deposition at p.
25; Wiseman Deposition at p. 20.)

(f)

Mary
McGee
supervised
clinical staff and was
clinical intervention.
Deposition at pp. 31-32.)

(g)

Turnabout had relationships with outside
health care professionals as well. (See
Wiseman Deposition at pp. 74-75.)

(h)

Turnabout is a community based day
treatment program and performs all the
services in the core definitions and
rules of the Division of Family Services,
Office of Licensing.
(See Comins
Deposition at pp. 23-24.)

(i)

Turnabout was doing anything that would
benefit the general mental health of the
community. (See Comins Deposition at p.
13.)

(j)

Turnabout provides counselling services.
(See Wiseman Deposition at p. 73.)
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rTurnabout'si
involved in
(See Wiseman

(k)

Turnabout performed psychological tests
on the youth in the programs.
(See
Wiseman Deposition at pp. 87-88.)

(1)

Turnabout performs intake evaluations
including
social,
health,
family,
psychological, and developmental.
(See
Wiseman Deposition at pp. 99-100.)

(m)

Turnabout
performed
psycho-social
assessments. (See Wiseman Deposition at
p. 102.)

(n)

Turnabout provided treatment plans for
its clients. (See Wiseman Deposition at
pp. 165-66.)

(o)

The Turnabout Policies and Procedures
Manual dated October 1989 . . . indicates
that [Turnabout's] Executive Director
must assume responsibility for the young
people in the program as well as perform
other duties as necessary. The program
also acknowledges
the existence of
Turnabout's
Director
of
Clinical
Services. (See Exhibit 3 at pp 4-7.)

(p)

. . . [In the] Affidavit of Ken Stettler,
a licensing specialist with the State of
Utahf
Department of Human Services,
Licensing Division. • . . M r . Stettler
states:
As a Licensing Specialist for the
Department of Human Services, since
[October] of 1989, I have had the
authority and responsibility of
reviewing, monitoring and licensing
youth treatment programs statewide.
During this time I have licensed the
Turnabout program to provide day
treatment services to adolescent
consumers ages 13 to 18. As defined
in the Human Service Code, UCA 62A2-101(6) states;
"Day
treatment"
means
specialized treatment for less
than 24 hours a day for four or
more persons who are unrelated
to the owner or provider and
who
have
emotional,
psychological, developmental,
physical,
or
behavioral
9

dysfunctions, impairments, or
chemical dependencies.
In order for a day treatment program
to be licensed by this Department,
the program must meet the core and
categorical rules for treatment as
specified in the Utah Administrative
Code R501-2, and R501-3-3.
These
rules indicate the minimum standards
to which a program must adhere in
order to maintain a license to
provide treatment services.
In the case of the Turnabout
program, they were first licensed to
provide day treatment services by
this Office in November 1988.
I
personally became responsible to
review, license, and monitor the
program in October of 1989. Since
then they have continued to meet the
standards and maintain a valid State
license.
This license allows all
staff affiliated with the program to
provide emotional, psychological,
behavioral. and mental health care
to
the
adolescent
consumers
enrolled.
The rendering of this
care is not limited solely to the
licensed
professionals
(i.e.
physician, psychologist, and social
worker) ,
but
has
been
the
responsibility of all staff in the
facility, including the program
administrators.
In the Turnabout
program all of the staff work as a
team to meet the treatment needs of
the program participants. It should
be noted that even though it is not
required
by
rule, the
program
directors of Turnabout have always
been
certified
as
addiction
counselors for as long as I have
been reviewing the program.
Although this certification is not
considered a professional license by
State statute, it does carry with it
the implication that the holder of
the certificate has specific skills
and responsibilities in providing
counseling
to
persons
with
addictions problems.
Such is the
case at the Turnabout program.
10

(See Exhibit 4.)
. . . [The trial court was also provided
with] the Affidavit of Loretta Garcia, an
Officer of the Department of Commerce,
Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
Ms. Garcia is in part
responsible for application of the Health
Care Malpractice Act and the PreLitigation Panel hearing requirements
included therein.
Ms. Garcia has
testified in similar affidavit form as
follows:
In answer to your question as to
whether Turnabout Day Treatment
Program is subject to the Medical
Malpractice Prelitigation Hearings
process, I have reviewed the Utah
Code
Ann.,
Section
78-14.
Specifically,
78-14-3(8) , 78-143(9), 78-14-3(10), 78-14-12(1)(a)
and 78-14-12(1)(c) read:
78-14-3(8) "Health care" means
[definition quoted from Act].
78-14-3(9)
"Health
care
provider" includes [definition
quoted from Act].
78-14-3(10) [Act quoted].
78-14-12(1)(a) The Department
of Commerce shall provide a
hearing
panel
in
alleged
medical
malpractice
cases
against health care providers
as defined in Section 78-14-3
filed after July 1, 1985,
except dentists.
78-14-12(1)(c) The proceedings
are informal and nonbinding,
but
are
compulsory
as
a
condition
precedent
to
c o m m e n c ing
litigation.
Proceedings
conducted
under
authority of this [s]ection are
confidential, privileged, and
immune from civil process.
Psychology, Social Work and Marriage
and Family Therapy are professions
regulated by the Mental Health
11

Regulatory
Acts
and
Practices.
Therefore, any legal action taken
against Turnabout Day Treatment
Program, which falls under those
categories, would be required to
follow the process put in place by
the legislature, which is to proceed
with the Prelitigation Hearing.
I have been serving as the Prelitigation
Specialist coordinating this program
since October 1987 and during that time
we have had hearings requested on almost
every health care field defined in 78-143.
(See Exhibit 5.)
Attached as Exhibit 6 [to defendants'
reply memorandum] is a letter dated
August 28, 1989 from the State of Utah,
Department of Social Services, Office of
Licensing addressed to Alan Comins and
Turnabout indicating that defendants
maintain a Social Services license.
Therein a core and categorical checklist
was referenced, which checklist will be
discussed below.
Defendants' licensing was [repeatedly]
renewed as reflected in Exhibit 6 and the
approval as reflected in Exhibit 7 [to
defendants' reply memorandum].
Exhibit 8 [to defendants' memorandum]
reflects that the services Turnabout
provides
include
comprehensive
day
treatment and human services.
Exhibit 9 [to defendants' memorandum] is
part of a Day Treatment Rules Checklist
of
the
Utah
Department
of
Social
Services, Office of Licensing, and was
completed by Mr. Stettler for defendants.
That checklist in part reflects that
defendants provide day treatment activity
which
includes
behavioral
training,
community living skills, work activity,
work
adjustment,
recreation,
selffeeding, self-care, toilet training,
social appropriateness, development of
gross
and
fine
motor
skills,
interpersonal
adjustment,
mobility
training, self-sufficiency training, to
encourage optimal mental or physical
12

function, speech, audiology, physical
therapy, and psychological services,
counseling and socialization.
Exhibit 10 [attached to defendants' reply
memorandum]
reflects
defendants'
additional licensure as do Exhibits 11,
12, 13 and 14.
Day treatment is defined by section
101(6) of chapter 2
(Licensure of
Programs and Facilities) under title 62A
(Human Services Code) as follows:
"Day treatment" means specialized
treatment for less than 24 hours a
day for four or more persons who are
unrelated to the owner or provider
and
who
have
emotional ,
psychological,
developmental,
physical or behavioral dysfunctions,
impa i rme n t s
or
c hemic a 1
dependencies.
Day treatment is
provided
in
lieu
of,
or
in
coordination
with,
a
more
restrictive residential inpatient
environment or service.
R501 of the Utah Department of Human
Services, Office of Licensing governs the
core and categorical rules of treatment
for day treatment centers including
defendants herein.
Subsection III.D.,
para.
1
thereof
in
part
covers
accreditation and references that "the
Office may accept accreditation by a
nationally recognized organization, e.g.,
Joint
Commission,
Commission
or
Accreditation
of
Rehabilitation
Facilities as compliance with these rules
for licensure."
(See Exhibit 15.)
Section III.B. of the Department's rules
sets forth the requirements for core
standards or "the license requirements
with which Human Service Programs must
comply" and allows for the governing body
of the Day Treatment Center to be a Board
of
Directors
in
a
non-profit
organization. (See Exhibit 15.) Section
C.III.D. of the Categorical Standard
Section of those rules allows for the
following program:
Day Treatment activity plans shall
be prepared to meet individual
13

consumer needs.
Daily activity
plans
may
include
behavioral
training, community living skills,
work activity, work adjustment,
recreation, self-feeding, self-care,
toilet
training,
social
appropriateness,
development
of
gross and fine motor skills, interpersonal
adjustment,
mobility
training, self-sufficiency training,
and to encourage optimal mental or
physical
function,
speech,
audiology, physical therapy, and
psychological services, counseling,
and socialization.
And subsection III.E.2.b. thereof sets
forth the requirements for health care in
the area of substance abuse.
(See
Exhibit 15.) Finally, section I of the
Department's Rules defines the term
"treatment/service
plan"
as
"a
comprehensive,
time-limited,
goal-oriented, individualized plan for
care,
treatment,
and
education
of
consumer in care. This service plan is
based
on
a
current
comprehensive
evaluation of the consumer's needs."
(R. at 1145-55 (and exhibits attached thereto at R. 1170-1226).)
(Emphasis added•)
6.

On August 23, 1993, the court held a hearing in this

matter on pending motions.

In addressing summary judgment, the

court was cited to further factual information before it including
what may be viewed as plaintiff's admissions in his own deposition
that defendants indicated they essentially had associates in social
worker or psychology (actually psychiatry) involved in the program
with

his

son

and

that

plaintiff

evidently

believed

and

had

complained that it was Turnabout and Alan Comins' fault that the
defendant did not provide 24-hour residential treatment for his
son.

(R. at 1613 (citing R. 737, 757).)
7.

The court was also informed and cited to the relevant

sources demonstrating the undisputed facts that (a) Turnabout's
14

clinical director was a licensed clinical social worker; (b) she
had

provided

appropriate

treatment

modalities

for

Turnabout

participants; (c) she had provided clinical supervision for staff
alcohol

and

abuse

counselors

(R.

1657);

(d) the

declaratory

judgment action against Turnabout had no bearing in this case as
defendants had had no right to argue therein and the issue of
subject matter

jurisdiction had not been at issue

(R. 1609);

(e) although defendants had asked plaintiff in interrogatories to
more explicitly detail plaintiff's allegation under the complaint,
plaintiff chose not to answer the interrogatories to discount any
allegation that defendants were providing treatment to plaintiff
(R. 1612-13);

(f) in order to be a Utah licensed day treatment

program Turnabout had a staff of physicians (R. 1622); (g) as part
of

its

license

from the Utah Department

of

Social Services,

defendants could provide, among other things, work adjustment,
social appropriateness, interpersonal adjustment, self-sufficiency
training, psychological services and counseling

(R. 1657);

(h)

Turnabout's clinical director (a licensed clinical social worker)
had participated in clinical intervention with plaintiff's son (R.
1659); (i) plaintiff's own exhibits to his memorandum demonstrated
that defendants

had on-staff psychiatrists, a psychologist, a

social worker, psychological resident and a marriage and family
therapist (R. 1659); (j) documents provided by plaintiff to the
court

included

treatment

plans

reflecting

treatment

Turnabout

provided to plaintiff's son (R. 1659); and (k) the treatment plans
Turnabout maintained for plaintiff's son were signed by defendants'
clinical director, Mary Magie, a licensed clinical social worker
(R. 1661).
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8.

In the hearing before the court on summary judgment,

plaintiff through his counsel also essentially admitted in part
that:

(1) if defendants are health care providers, plaintiff's

lawsuit fails

(R. 1636);

(2) Utah's Human Services regulatory

scheme uses the term "treatment" for the day treatment services
Turnabout provided (R. 1641); (3) plaintiff had attempted to obtain
a supplemental affidavit from the Utah Division of Professional
Licensing to contradict Turnabout's claim that it was a health care
provider but the director thereof had refused plaintiff's request
since the director allegedly wanted the Division of Professional
Licensing to be able to regulate Turnabout (R. 1642); (4) Turnabout
had provided tests for plaintiff's son including a personality or
MMPI

test

(R.

1645);

and

(5) Turnabout

was

Department of Social Services (R. 1646, 1648).

licensed

by

the

Plaintiff himself

was present in court when these "admissions" were essentially made
on his behalf,
9.

Cf. R. 1631 (reference to Mr. Platts in court).

On July 16, 1993, defendants submitted an additional

affirmative defense to their proposed amended complaint further
clarifying that plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was governed
by

the

conditions

and

limitations

of

the

Utah

Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq.
10.

Health

Care

(R. 1357.)

After taking the matter under advisement, the court

issued its minute entry as follows:
1.
Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer
to More Expressly State Affirmative Defense
that defendants are health care providers is
granted.
2.
Defendants' Motion
for
Summary
Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth
in defendants' Memorandum in Support and in
Reply thereto, limited however to this Court's
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determination that defendants are "health care
providers" as defined by the Utah Healthcare
Malpractice Act, thereby depriving this Court
of subject matter jurisdiction.
(R. 1557-58, 1569.)
11.

After plaintiff

filed his notice of appeal in this

matter, defendants filed their motion to require appellant to
request the transcript of the court's hearing and pay for the same.
(R. 1573-77.)

The court was advised that a transcript of oral

argument on August 23, 1993, was necessary in order to fully advise
this Court as to claims plaintiff was going to raise on appeal.
(R. 1576.)

The trial court granted this motion.

(R. 1587, 1590,

1592.)
12.

In his brief on appeal plaintiff has again essentially

conceded that this case was instituted after plaintiff had signed
a contract with defendant for the "treatment" of his son and that
plaintiff's
essentially

injuries

resulted

confine his son

from

defendants7

failure

to

(see plaintiff's brief at p. 2 ) .

Plaintiff has not raised any argument on appeal that the trial
court erred in allowing defendants to amend their complaint.

(See

plaintiff's brief.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment should be affirmed on appeal since the trial
court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff's

case

due

to

plaintiff's

failure

to

comply

with

provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act before suing
defendants, health care providers, for treatment and confinement
plaintiff claims should have been rendered and provided to his son.
Alternatively,

this

Court

can

affirm

the

trial

court's

granting of summary judgment since even if this case does not
17

involve

provisions

of

the

Utah

Health

Care

Malpractice

Act,

plaintiff could not prove his theories of recovery given undisputed
material facts when considered with the applicable rules of law.
In other respects, the trial court did not clearly abuse its
discretion

in

requiring

plaintiff

to

request

and

pay

for

a

transcript of the court's hearing since in that hearing plaintiff
essentially admitted facts and claims—descriptions of which were
necessary for this Court's complete review.
Finally, plaintiff's miscellaneous allegations in his brief
are either

erroneous, incomplete

or not

sufficient bases

for

reversal on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND BASED UPON UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION
AND THUS CORRECTLY AWARDED DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

Statement of Review.
As noted to the trial court below at R. 155-57, although

plaintiff has identified the general standard for review of summary
judgment issues, that standard is not completely stated.

Even if

there are factual disputes (defendants claim there is no dispute
here as to material facts), this Court can conclude that summary
judgment is appropriate when the moving parties are entitled to
relief as a matter of law.

For example, if the law does not

recognize a duty as alleged, disputed facts regarding the breach of
an alleged duty are irrelevant and summary judgment is appropriate.
See Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Utah 1987)
(in case involving summary judgment, "It is axiomatic that one may
not be liable to another in tort absent a duty.
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The question of

whether

a

duty

omitted.)).

exists

is

a

question

Whether defendants

of

law."

(Footnotes

are health care providers

as

defined by Utah statute and based upon sworn evidence also should
be viewed a question of law. Cf. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d
445,

446

(Utah

1982)

(statute

applied

according

to

literal

wording).
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has declared that
summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (identical to the Utah R. Civ. P. 56) is an efficient way
of concluding
manner.

litigation

in a

"just, speedy and

inexpensive"

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327

(1986).

Summary judgment is thus properly granted against a plaintiff who
fails to establish the essential elements of his case for which he
bears the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322.

In quoting an earlier case, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986), the Court explained the standard:
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil
case moves for summary judgment . . . based on
the lack of proof of a material fact, the
judge must ask himself not whether he thinks
the evidence unmistakably favors one side or
the other but whether a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the
evidence presented. The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.
The
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks
whether reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.
Id. at 252 (emphasis added).

Likewise, a party opposing a motion

for summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
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Matsushita

Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986).

This triad of Supreme Court cases clearly establishes the

desirability of summary judgment under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and
(by analogy under Utah R. Civ. P. 56) as a means of resolving cases
which requires more than hypothetical arguments or speculative
propositions to prevail.
In applying the established case law to the facts, the trial
court correctly awarded summary judgment as a matter of law and
plaintiff otherwise had raised no claim against defendants which
could be presented to a jury through more than an insufficient
scintilla of evidence.
B.

The Express Statutory Provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act Control in This Case, and Since Defendants Are
Health Care Providers, the Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, the Utah

Health Care Malpractice Act controls in this case and necessitated
the awarding of summary judgment to the defendants upon those
grounds

set

plaintiff,

forth
through

in defendants' memoranda
his

counsel, has

filed

essentially

below.

As

admitted, if

defendants are health care providers, plaintiff's claim fails.
(Compare R. at 1636 ("[Plaintiff] will submit, if [defendants] are
a health care provider

[sic] and if they were a health care

provider [sic] when this lawsuit was filed, they get to walk.
is as easy as that . . . .

It

[Plaintiff] can't hold them accountable

for Gary [Platts'] death."), with Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-8, -12
(statutory prerequisite to suit); see also Deschamps v. Pulley, 784
P.2d

471, 475 n. 2

(Utah App.

principles consistently

1989)

(courts applying

agency

find client bound by acts of attorney

within scope of attorney's authority); Rackham v. Rackham, 230 P.2d
20

566, 570 (Utah 1951) (since plaintiff in court when her counsel
made oral stipulation and she made no objection, she acquiesced in
her counsel's action and objection on appeal was inadequate).)
The

trial

allegations

and

definitions

of

court
the

was

thus

required

undisputed

"health

care,"

evidence
"health

to

apply
of

care

plaintiff's

record

to

the

provider,"

and

"malpractice action" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3.3
In trying to avoid defendants' award of summary judgment,
plaintiff claimed below that "the services provided by Turnabout
were not health care services, nor were the people providing the
services health care providers or even professionals. Rather, the
people providing the services were recovering alcoholics, trying to
pass themselves off as 'help' for unsuspecting parents" (see R.
889).

Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to offer to the trial court

any competent evidentiary

support for this claim and in fact

presented evidence and allegations compelling summary judgment. In
contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1994)4 defines a
health care provider as including
any
person,
partnership,
association,
corporation, or other facility or institution
who causes to be rendered or who renders
health care or professional services as a
hospital,
physician,
registered
nurse,
3

Since plaintiff has not appealed the trial court's granting
of defendants' motion to amend their answer to further clarify an
affirmative defense, the issue as to whether defendants could
properly file a motion for summary judgment (arguing the trial
court lacked jurisdiction) is not before this Court. Regardless,
defendants were entitled at any time to raise the issue that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction for plaintiff's failure to comply
with provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. See
generally Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Utah App.
1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (1992).
4

See footnote 1, supra, p. 3.
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licensed
practical
nurse,
nurse-midwife,
dentist,
dental
hygienist,
optometrist,
clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist,
physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist,
chiropractic
physician,
naturopathic
physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic
physician and surgeon, audiologist, speechlanguage pathologist, certified social worker,
social service worker, social service aide,
marriage and family counselor, practitioner of
obstetrics, or others rendering similar care
and services relating to or arising out of the
health needs of persons or groups of persons
and officers, employees, or agents of any of
the above acting in the course and scope of
their employment,
(Emphasis added.)
Importantly, as this Court has held, the interpretation of a
statute presents a question of law which is not for the jury's
determination.

See Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d

1042

(1992).

And, as the Utah

Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated, a statute should be applied
according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused
or inoperable; and it must be assumed that each term in the statute
was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be
interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning
and in harmony with the other provisions within an act since it is
not the duty of the courts to assess the wisdom of the statutory
scheme.

See West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah

1982) .
Applying

these

standards

to

the

case

at

hand

clearly

demonstrates that the trial court correctly ruled that defendants
are health care providers within the meaning of the Utah Health
Care

Malpractice

Act.

Certainly

defendants

are

persons

and

associations who render health care or professional services such
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as those of a Certified Social Worker, Social Service Worker,
Social Service Aide or Family Counselor,

"or others rendering

similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health
needs of persons or groups of persons."
78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1994).

See Utah Code Ann. §

Also, that section defines health care

providers as " officers. employees or agents of any of the above
acting

in

the

course

and

scope

of

their

employment."

Interestingly, in essentially making his argument that defendants
should not be deemed health care providers since they are not
"licensed" by the state (see plaintiff's brief generally at pp. 1013) plaintiff has ignored

(1) that defendants are health care

providers within the definition of "others rendering similar care
or

services"

to

those

professions

listed;

(2)

that

Section

78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1994) defining "health care provider" does not
state (as plaintiff suggests) that a license is required for those
rendering "similar care or services"; (3) that if Turnabout is a
health care provider, defendant Comins and other employees are
protected by the above-emphasized clause "officers, employees or
agents"; and (4) that Turnabout is licensed by the State of Utah to
provide

day

treatment

services

including

psychological

and

counseling services (R. 1200-1201) and thus, even under plaintiff's
erroneous view of licensure, is a health care provider protected by
the Act.
Under

statutory

definitions,

then,

Turnabout are health care providers.
conclusion

results

from

the

fact

both

Alan

Comins

and

Further support for this

that

plaintiff

has

already

admitted Turnabout had a licensed clinical social worker on staff
(see R. at 884), and the undisputed evidence of record clearly
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demonstrated she was defendants' clinical director
11(e)).

(supra p. 8

In addition, the sworn affidavits of Ken Stettler (a

licensing specialist for Utah's Department of Human Services (supra
pp. 9-10)) and Loretta Garcia (an officer of Utah's Department of
Commerce,

Division

of Occupational

and

Professional

Licensing

(supra pp. 11-12)) presented below belie plaintiff's contention
that defendants are not entitled to protection under the Health
Care Malpractice Act. Specifically, as a licensing specialist with
the

State

Department

essentially

defined

of

Social

defendants

Services,

as

health

Ken
care

Stettler

has

providers

and

testified that licenses were issued for the social-service-type
health care defendants provide, which licenses entitled Turnabout
and

even

its

unlicensed

professionals

to

provide

emotional,

psychological, behavioral and mental health care to plaintiff's son
and others.

(R. 1200-1201.)

Similarly, as an officer of the

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing which "manages"
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Loretta Garcia essentially
indicated that defendants are health care providers within the
provisions of that Act and are entitled to rely on its provisions
and seek its protection.

(R. 1203-1204.)

Certainly, the day-treatment license that has been awarded to
defendants mandates

that defendants be viewed

as health

care

providers since day treatment is statutorily defined in Utah Code
Ann.

§ 62A-1-101(6)

as

involving

emotional,

psychological,

development, physical or behavioral dysfunction impairments or
chemical dependencies.

(See R. 1205, 1209-18.) Also, the Core and

Categorical Rules for Treatment utilized by the State Department of
Human Services (licensing defendant Turnabout) indicate that that
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state office may accept accreditation by nationally recognized
organizations (such as the National Association of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Counselors of which defendant Comins and Turnabout's director
are members)

(R. 1220) and the rules of Utah's Human Services

Department allow for defendants' daily activity "treatment plans"
to include "behavioral training, community living skills, work
activity, work adjustment, recreation, self-feeding, self-care,
toilet training, social appropriateness, development of gross and
fine motor skills, interpersonal adjustment, mobility training,
self-sufficiency
physical

training, and to encourage optimal mental or

function,

speech,

audiology,

physical

therapy,

psychological services, counseling, and socialization."

and

(See R.

1209, 1219-24.)
In short, plaintiff offered no competent credible evidence to
raise a question of fact as to whether defendants are health care
providers; and as a matter of law, the trial court correctly ruled
that such is the case.
C.

Plaintiff's Own Factual Admissions Demonstrate That the Trial
Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment.
Importantly, plaintiff has not acknowledged in his brief on

appeal all of the factual admissions identified in his papers filed
with the court below or made in plaintiff's statements in open
court, through plaintiff's counsel, on August 23, 1993.

(See,

e.g. , statement of facts, supra, pp. 15-16 at 1f1f 7-8.)
Specifically, the very exhibits plaintiff filed with the court
to avoid summary judgment demonstrate the appropriateness thereof.
For example

(1) Turnabout's treatment plan for plaintiff's son

outlines behavioral modification goals and social work issues and
25

is signed by Turnabout's clinical director, a licensed clinical
social worker (R. 1089-90),

(2) defendants' amendments to their

articles of incorporation demonstrate that among other things they
run

programs

that

benefit

the

general

mental

health

of

the

community and provide "intervention, treatment and after care of
youth with alcohol/drug problems and/or behavior problems" (R.
1096), (3) Turnabout's advertising provides that it is offering
"comprehensive day treatment and human services" (R. 1105), and
Turnabout provides social services work (R. 1109), (4) the contract
between plaintiff and defendants demonstrates that defendants were
entitled to address medical treatment and testing, guidance-type
discipline and restraint for plaintiff's son (R. 1110), (5) regular
social work-type progress notes were kept on plaintiff's son and
reviewed and signed off by Turnabout's clinical director, Mary
Magie, a licensed clinical social worker (R. 1112-18), and (6)
program job descriptions provided by plaintiff to the trial court
also demonstrate that defendants' director of clinical services (a
licensed

clinical

social

worker)

provided

supervision

over

Turnabout staff (R. 1131).
Moreover, if defendants are health care providers, plaintiff
cannot

now

credibly

dispute

on

appeal

that

his

claim

is

a

malpractice action under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
Plaintiff essentially admitted this fact to the trial court (R. at
1636 quoted at p. 20, supra), and malpractice action is defined as
"any action against a health care provider, whether in contract,
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise. based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care
26

providers." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 1994).

Similarly,

health care "means any act or treatment performed or furnished or
which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider" including acts related to confinement issues.
Here, plaintiff has claimed that defendants failed to properly
treat

(see, e.g. , R.

at

8; plaintiff's

brief

at p.

2)

and

essentially confine (see, e.g., R. at 8-9; plaintiff's brief p. 2)
his son.

Thus, plaintiff cannot credibly argue that his claims do

not surround "any act" which should have been performed by a health
care provider (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10) (Supp. 1994)) whether
in

contract,

otherwise."

tort,

breach

of

warranty,

wrongful

death

"or

(Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 1994).)
POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD ALTERNATIVELY APPROPRIATELY AFFIRM
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE BASED UPON UNDISPUTED FACTS AND
BINDING CASE LAW PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT BELOW.
ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY FORMING A BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURTS
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
This Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied
on below."

Higqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993)

(citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah
1992) ) . As such, on appeal this Court can conclude that based upon
additional argument presented to the trial court summary judgment
was appropriate as a matter of law and based on the undisputed fact
that plaintiff could not prove his theories of recovery as alleged.
For a complete analysis of defendants' arguments in this regard,
this Court is referred to defendants' memoranda below at R. 682-92,
1162-66.

And

the Court

is further cited to the

"undisputed

statement of facts" supporting that analysis at R. 644-77.
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To

summarize that argument presented to the trial court:

Each of

plaintiff's theories for recovery fail on the merits.
A.

Breach of Contract
Although in paragraph 44 of plaintiff's complaint plaintiff

alleges that "by releasing Gary Platts in violation of its own
policies, Turnabout failed to provide the treatment called for by
the contract thus materially breaching its contract with plaintiff"
(R. at 5 ) , plaintiff was unable to prove that any contract agreed
to by the parties for which consideration was paid included the
condition that defendants would not allow plaintiff's son, Gary
Platts, to go to school, after which plaintiff claims his son ran
away and committed suicide. Rather than producing a contract which
states that defendants agreed not to allow Gary Platts to attend
school,

plaintiff

must

have

essentially

relied

upon

allegations in paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 of his complaint:
15. Turnabout
represented
that
it
"offers the personnel to check or verify that
youth are where they should be, when they
should be."
16. Turnabout further represented that
"[i]f a youth has run away, we will look for
him or her; truant from school, we will
monitor him or her; abusive in the home, we'll
come there."

18. On or about June 21, 1989, Plaintiff
signed a contract with Turnabout for the
treatment of Gary Platts.
This contract
called for payment of $5,400.00, payable
$1,500.00 dollars down and $325.00 per month
for 12 consecutive months beginning August 1,
1989, in return for said treatment. A true
and correct copy of said contract is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated by
this reference.
(R. at 4-5.)
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his

own

However, even if plaintiff's allegations in paragraphs 15 and
16 of the complaint are accurate, this is not a binding contractual
obligation for which Gary Platts' suicide demonstrates a breach.
Further, evidently no contract was attached to the court's copy of
plaintiff's

complaint

and the

"Exhibit A" to which

plaintiff

referred the contract in no way provides that defendants agreed not
to allow Gary Piatts to go to school* Accordingly, there can be no
claim for breach of contract under the applicable document, and
defendants are entitled to summary judgment thereon.
B.

Negligence
To support plaintiff's claim of negligence, he alleged:
50. On or about February 22, 1990, John
Does I through XX reviewed the treatment of
Gary Platts and the request of Plaintiff to
take Gary out of the program and decided
against releasing Gary Platts from "24 hour
residential treatment."
51. On February 24, 1990, Turnabout told
Plaintiff that Gary was not ready to be
released.
52. Without consulting Plaintiff and in
violation of Turnabout policies, Defendants
Turnabout, Comins and John Does I - XXV
released Gary to go to school on February 27,
1990 knowing of his depression, feelings of
inadequacy, marijuana use and tendencies to
run away.
53. The release of Gary Platts by the
Defendants breached the duty of care owed
Plaintiff and Gary Platts.
54. The release of Gary Platts was a
direct and proximate cause of Gary Piatt's
[sic] death.

(R.

at

9.)

Notwithstanding

these

allegations, however, the

undisputed material facts clearly established that by his own
admission plaintiff at all times himself maintained custody over
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his

son

and

was

responsible

for

him

even when

his

son

was

participating in the Turnabout program (see R. at 737, 741-42,
quoted at R. 653-55) (which was only during the day on hours when
the children were not attending school). While plaintiff may claim
that Turnabout was a 24-hour residential treatment program, he
admitted that that may have only been his description of the
program (see R. at p. 757, quoted at R. 657), and testimony of
defendants' two directors reflected that theirs was not a 24-hour
treatment program.
811,

quoted

at

(See, e.g., R. at 780, quoted at R. 663; 810-

R.

670.)

Further,

contrary

to

plaintiff's

allegation that Turnabout never told plaintiff that Gary was not
ready to be released (see Complaint at H 51, R. at 9) defendants
did not have custody of Gary and the decision of "releasing" was
not theirs to make, which fact plaintiff has essentially admitted
(see R.

760).

Further, any

"release" of Gary Platts by the

defendants could not have breached any duty of care proximately
causing plaintiffs claimed injuries since those injuries were
caused by Gary Platts' own intentional acts in shooting himself.
See generally Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482,
488

(Utah App.

1991)

(unforeseeable

superseding

act

defendant of liability for any original negligence).

relieves

Defendants

could not foresee that Gary Platts' trip to school would result in
his

suicide

days

later.

Accordingly, plaintiff's

theory

for

negligence fails.
C.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Retherford v. A T & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah

1992), the Utah Supreme Court held that to sustain a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress plaintiff must show
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that "(i) [defendant's] conduct was outrageous and intolerable and
that

it offended

against

the generally

accepted

standards of

decency and morality; (ii) [defendant] intended to cause or acted
in

reckless

disregard

of

a

likelihood

of

causing

emotional

distress; (iii) [plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress; and
(iv)

[defendant's]

conduct

emotional distress."

proximately

caused

[plaintiff's]

(Id. at 970-71 (citation omitted).) Applying

this standard and these elements to the undisputed statement of
facts

clearly

demonstrate

that

there

is

no

reasonable

likelihood that a jury could conclude that defendants' conduct was
"outrageous

and

intolerable

and that it offended

against

the

generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Retherford,
supra.
Indeed,

plaintiff

essentially

claims

that

defendants'

impermissible conduct consisted of allowing plaintiff's son to go
to school.

Even if this accurate, allowing Gary Platts to go to

school during a time when plaintiff retained custody over his son
was not outrageous, intolerable, or offending against generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.

Further, there is no

evidence that defendants intended to cause or acted in reckless
disregard

of

the

likelihood

of

causing

plaintiff

Ron

Platts

emotional distress by allowing Gary Platts to go to school, when
such

conduct

emotional

did

distress

not

proximately

given

the

cause

plaintiff's

intervening

intentional

alleged
acts

of

plaintiff's son in committing suicide.
D.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
This Court is well aware of those cases establishing the zone

of danger rule in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.
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See, e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988); Boucher v.
Dixon Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1992) (zone of danger
approach only "allows recovery to plaintiffs who suffer emotional
distress because of another's negligence, though they do not suffer
any physical impact, only if the plaintiffs are placed in actual
physical peril and fear for their own safety") (footnote omitted).
Certainly plaintiff has not and cannot claim here that he was
placed in actual physical peril and fear for his own safety. Thus,
plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
must fail.
E.

Failure to Supervise
In asserting his failure to supervise claim plaintiff alleged:
72. Gary Platts was a youth participant
in Turnabout's treatment program.
73. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff
to supervise Gary Platts.
74.
Platts.

Defendants failed to supervise Gary

75. Defendants' failure to supervise
Gary Platts directly and proximately resulted
in the death of Gary Platts.
R. at 12.
Nevertheless, applying the undisputed facts provided to the
trial court (see R. at 644-77) demonstrates that since plaintiff
categorically admitted that he had custody over his son (see, e.g.,
R. 737, 741-42), it was his duty to supervise Gary Platts and he
could

not

informally

transfer

that

custody

to

another.

In

addition, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that defendants'
supervision over Gary Platts was limited only to when he was in
their program and after school
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(see, e.g., R. at 738

(during

evening hours plaintiff took his son home [if he was not staying in
the

home

of

a parent whose

defendants' program])).

child was

also participating

in

In this case, there is no dispute that

Gary Platts left for school after staying in the home of another
(see R. at 5, complaint U 24; R. at 759, quoted at R. 657-58
(plaintiffs permission for his son to stay with others)) and not
at defendants' facility and that he never returned to defendants'
facility (see R. at 7; complaint H 37). There can be no dispute
then that at the time Gary Platts ran away he was not being
supervised by defendants as he was at or leaving school. Further,
even if the Court were to conclude otherwise, this alleged "failure
to

supervise"

did

not

directly

and

proximately

result

in

plaintiff's claimed injuries since Gary Platts' own intervening
actions resulted in the unfortunate outcome.

(See discussion re

intervening act at p. 30, supra.)
F.

False Advertising
As his sixth cause of action plaintiff claimed:
78. In an attempt to solicit business,
Turnabout and John Does I through XXXV
published brochures describing the Turnabout
program.
79. Included in these brochures are
representations that "Parents will decide the
length of time that they wish to be involved
with the program" and "Turnabout offers the
personnel to check or verify that youth are
where they should be, when they should be."
80. Representations within the brochures
were false.
81. Defendant knew these representations
were false.

(R. at 13-14.)
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A specific action or omission which plaintiff

essentially

alleged defendants failed to take was allowing Gary Platts to go to
school.

This

claim

fails,

however,

since

nowhere

in

their

published brochures did defendants guarantee that they would not
allow plaintiff's son to go to school.

In fact, plaintiff has

admitted that he never told defendants not to send his son to
school (R. 760, quoted at R. 658). Further, plaintiff's allegation
that the brochure stated that "Turnabout offers the personnel to
check or verify the youth are where they should be, when the should
be" does not advertise that defendants would guarantee that Gary
Platts would not run away from school and commit suicide.
G.

Fraud
The

sole

claim

that

plaintiff

made

for

fraud

is

that

defendants made at least the following representations:
(a) Parents will decide the length of
time that they wish to be involved with the
program; and
(b) Turnabout offers the personnel to
check or verify that youth are where they
should be, when they should be.
(R. at 15.)

These allegations fail, however, since plaintiff did

not state his claim for fraud with particularity as required by
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, the Utah

Supreme Court has restated the elements of fraud as including:
1.

That a representation was made;

2.
Concerning
material fact;
3.

a

presently

existing

Which was false;

4.
Which the representor either (a)
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient
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knowledge
upon
representation;

which

to

base

5.
For the purpose of
other party to act upon it;

such

inducing

the

6.
That
the
other
party,
acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
7.

Did in fact rely upon it;

8.

And was thereby induced to act;

9.

To his [or her] injury and damage.

Crookstone v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 F.2d 789, 800 (Utah
1991) (citations omitted).
Applying these elements to the case at hand demonstrates that
plaintiff did not establish that a representation was made which
was false since plaintiff has admitted that he had custody over his
child and could therefore decide the time he wished his child to be
involved in the program (see generally R. at 737 (quoted at R. 653,
740-41 (quoted at R. 654))).

And, although defendants may have

offered personnel to check or verify youth, that does not mean that
they

would

not

have

allowed

discussion, supra, pp. 32-34).
support

the

fact

that

these

a

youth

to

go

to

school

(see

Further, there is no evidence to
statements

were

made

to

induce

plaintiff to act and that he acted reasonably and in ignorance of
their falsity.

This is so since any adult must know that if he

retains custody over a child, he can decide how long the child is
in the program, and any adult should know that a program such as
this that only offers assistance during hours when the child is not
at a home or in school has no authority to take formal custody of
the youth.

Also, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he relied

upon these statements, was induced to act thereon and was injured
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thereby

since it was the intervening actions of his son that

resulted in plaintiff's claimed injuries.
H.

Negligent Misrepresentation
Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim centered around

this allegation:
93. Turnabout and John Does I through XXXV
negligently misrepresented the circumstance of
Turnabout
by
making
at
least
those
representations detailed in paragraph 82 of
this Complaint which are incorporated by this
reference as though fully set forth herein.
Nevertheless, under Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,

plaintiff

did

not

state

his

claim

for

negligent

misrepresentation with particularity as required by that rule in
cases such as Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966
(Utah 1982).
In sum, the trial court had before it numerous bases upon
which it could appropriately grant defendants summary judgment in
this case and to require further litigation in a trial on such
issues is not merited.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING PLAINTIFF
TO PAY FOR THE COSTS OF A TRANSCRIPT
FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW ON APPEAL
The trial court's decision to require plaintiff to request and
pay for the cost of a transcript for this Court's review was
appropriate and did not abuse the discretion. Cf. T.S. Partnership
v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1994) (determination of attorney
fees within sound discretion of trial court and not overturned
absent showing of clear abuse of discretion)•
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In factf a simple review of that transcript sets forth the
admissions essentially made by plaintiff to the trial court, which
admissions demonstrate the appropriateness of the trial court's
award of summary judgment and this Court's affirmance on appeal.
Specifically, as set forth in defendants' statement of facts
(supra p. 16, H 8 ) , the transcript in question demonstrates that
plaintiff (through his counsel) essentially admitted in the hearing
before

the

trial

court

that

if

defendants

providers, plaintiff's lawsuit fails (R. 1636).

are

health

care

Plaintiff also

essentially admitted that Utah's human services regulatory scheme
used the term "treatment" for those services Turnabout provided
(R. 1641) and plaintiff identified his failed attempts to obtain
sworn testimony disputing the fact that defendants were health care
providers (R. 1642).

Plaintiff also noted that Turnabout provided

psychological/personality tests for plaintiff's son (R. 1645) and
that Turnabout was at all material times licensed by the Department
of Social Services (R. 1646, 1648).
As

indicated

previously,

plaintiff

is

bound

by

these

"admissions" as he was present in court when his counsel made the
same.

(See Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475 n. 2 (Utah App.

1989) (courts applying agency principles consistently find client
bound by acts of attorney within scope of attorney's authority);
Rackham v. Rackham, 230 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah 1951) (since plaintiff
in court when her counsel made oral stipulation and she made no
objection, she acquiesced in her counsel's action and objection on
appeal was inadequate).)
The import of plaintiff's "admissions" at the trial court
level cannot be overstated as they demonstrate the meritless nature
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of plaintiff's claims in this suit (i.e., Turnabout is licensed by
the Department

of Social Services, thus disputing

plaintiff's

"licensure" argument on appeal), and justify the court's decision
requiring plaintiff to request and pay for a transcript of that
hearing.
Similarly, the transcript is important since a plain review of
the same demonstrates the misleading claims in plaintiff's brief on
appeal.

For example, on pages 4-5 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff

asserts

that

defendants'

defense

is

based

on

defendants'

"assumption" that since Comins and his colleague who operated
Turnabout

were

credentialed

addiction

counselors,

they

and

Turnabout were health care providers under the Utah Health Care
Malpractice

Act.

This

defendants'

complete

is

not

argument,

an
and

accurate
a

plain

description
review

of

of
that

transcript

(which plaintiff now argues he should not have been

forced

provide)

to

demonstrates

this

fact.

In

short,

the

transcript was insightful for this Court's evaluation on appeal,
and the trial court correctly ordered plaintiff to request and pay
for the same.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS MISCELLANEOUS ALLEGATIONS IN HIS BRIEF
ARE EITHER ERRONEOUS. INCOMPLETE
OR INSUFFICIENT BASES FOR REVERSAL ON APPEAL
Arguments and statements plaintiff makes in his brief on
appeal are either inaccurate or not supportable.

For example, on

page 3 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff claims that defendants "do
not provide any professional services." Not only is this statement
without any credible cite to the record, but it is also inaccurate
as demonstrated

above.

See supra, pp. 8-10.
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And

plaintiff

incredulously and implicitly claims without any support in the
record and contrary to the transcript that the trial court reached
its conclusion solely on the basis that since defendant Comins was
a credentialed addiction counsel he and Turnabout were health care
providers.

(Compare plaintiff's brief at p. 5 with court's ruling

at R. 1557-58, 1569.)
Next,

although

plaintiff

erroneously

claims

that

"the

individuals employed by [Turnabout] do not fit within any of the
categories provided for by the Act" as health care providers (see
plaintiff's brief at p. 6 ) , this claim follows directly upon the
heels of plaintiff's own citation in his brief to the Health Care
Malpractice Act which defines health care providers in part as
"officers, employees, agents" of any person or entity rendering
similar care and services.
Plaintiff

also

(See plaintiff's brief at p. 6.)

ignores

the

fact

that

his

own

statutory

construction analysis speaks against the proposition he raises on
appeal.

Specifically, this Court can easily conclude that had the

Utah legislature intended to restrict the definition of health care
providers only to those who were "licensed" as plaintiff claims
(see plaintiff's brief at p. 5 ) , it would have been very easy for
it to insert that "licensure requirement" into the statute during
any of the five or six times it has amended that Act since 1976.
The

fact

that

the

legislature

chose

not

to

use

that

term

demonstrates its intent not to limit the definition of "health care
providers"

only

to

those

who

are

"licensed."

Similarly,

plaintiff's entire "licensure" analogy fails as a matter of logic.
Assume plaintiff was injured in a hospital's operating room by a
"scrub tech" who is not licensed by the state but allowed to assist
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in surgery.

This "scrub tech" would be protected by the Act as a

licensed health care provider's employee just as defendant Comins
is protected as an employee of Turnabout where the State of Utah
has given Turnabout a license to provide health care services (see
affidavit of Kenneth Stettler at R. 1200-1201), which license
entitles unlicensed professionals working for Turnabout to provide
that care (see id,) .
As demonstrated above, plaintiff's references in his brief to
exhibits presented to the trial court are also misleading and
incomplete (see supra pp. 25-26).

Further, plaintiff ignores the

fact that the supplemental affidavit of Kenneth Stettler in no way
controverts that affidavit supporting the trial court's conclusion
below.

(Compare plaintiff's brief at p. 12 with affidavit at R.

1200-1201.)

Indeed, all plaintiff was essentially able to get

Mr. Stettler to concede in a material, if relevant, fashion in his
amended affidavit is that Mr. Comins himself is not licensed by the
State of Utah.

(Mr. Comins remains an employee of a licensed

provider.)
Plaintiff likewise has no credible citation to the record that
treatment at Turnabout was essentially provided for by the peers of
plaintiff's son.

(See plaintiff's brief at p. 13.)

And plaintiff

has no cite to the record for his claim that professional services
were not included

as part of defendants' program

fee.

(See

plaintiff's brief at p. 18.)
Finally, this Court should ignore plaintiff's erroneous and
misleading claims on pages 19-20 of plaintiff's brief that a
decision by a different judge in a declaratory judgment lawsuit
between

defendants' insurers

and
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defendants

(where

the

trial

court's minute entry simply reflects that a fact issue avoided the
plaintiff's motion in that case for summary judgment (see R. 1443))
somehow bars the trial court's ruling in this case.

That is not

the case and plaintiff's claimed "facts" are without appropriate
citation to the record and are erroneous in any event,5

Further,

plaintiff has no basis and has not cited this Court to any evidence
supportive

of

malpractice

his claim that defendants

insurance

do not have medical

(ostensibly because they do not provide

health care related services) (see plaintiff's brief at p. 5 ) .
CONCLUSION
The trial court essentially concluded that it was without
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's case since defendants were health
care

providers

prerequisites

and

plaintiff

had

failed

to

comply

with

of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act

initiating his malpractice action.

the

before

This Court can also affirm the

trial court on other grounds argued below which do not form a basis
of the trial court's actual ruling, and the trial court correctly
required plaintiff to provide a copy of the transcript of the
argument

below,

which

transcript

demonstrates

plaintiff's

admissions supportive of the trial court's ruling and points out
inaccuracies in plaintiff's brief on appeal.
5

If this Court wishes to consider plaintiff's incorrect
claim regarding the effect, if any, of a trial court's denial of
summary judgment in a different case (involving a declaratory
judgment action by defendants' insurer), this Court should (1)
allow defendants to supplement the record with the insurer's
motion for summary judgment arguing the issue of a "professional
services" exclusion in an insurance policy, which motion did not
deal with the issues in this case, (2) allow defendants to
supplement the record with a copy of the hearing transcript in
the declaratory judgment action, and (3) consider defendants'
analysis defeating any collateral estoppel claim. See R. at
1544-45.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of

1995.
HANSON, EPPE

MITH

JARYL L. RENCHER
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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